张艳玲, 莫廷钰, 李松涛, 张妍, 李擎. 演化博弈与资源配置综述[J]. 工程科学学报, 2022, 44(3): 402-410. DOI: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2020.10.26.002
引用本文: 张艳玲, 莫廷钰, 李松涛, 张妍, 李擎. 演化博弈与资源配置综述[J]. 工程科学学报, 2022, 44(3): 402-410. DOI: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2020.10.26.002
ZHANG Yan-ling, MO Ting-yu, LI Song-tao, ZHANG Yan, LI Qing. A survey of evolutionary game and resource allocation[J]. Chinese Journal of Engineering, 2022, 44(3): 402-410. DOI: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2020.10.26.002
Citation: ZHANG Yan-ling, MO Ting-yu, LI Song-tao, ZHANG Yan, LI Qing. A survey of evolutionary game and resource allocation[J]. Chinese Journal of Engineering, 2022, 44(3): 402-410. DOI: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2020.10.26.002

演化博弈与资源配置综述

A survey of evolutionary game and resource allocation

  • 摘要: 复杂网络上集群行为的研究是多学科交叉的热点,行为学实验不仅证实了集群行为的普遍存在性,而且证实了利用演化论解释集群行为涌现的合理性。复杂网络上演化博弈理论已取得长足发展,特别是在两策略竞争理论分析方法上取得突破性进展。首先介绍了演化博弈框架下合作演化机制的相关研究,详细总结了近年来被广泛关注的个体异质性和环境反馈对于合作演化的影响研究;其次阐述了五种复杂网络上演化博弈的理论分析方法,包括最近提出的适用于任意网络结构和更新规则的溯祖随机游走理论;再次给出了基于最后通牒博弈模型的资源配置问题研究;最后总结了复杂网络最后通牒博弈所面临的挑战及未来发展趋势。

     

    Abstract: Evolutionary game theory involves multiple disciplinary sciences and has enormous scientific value and promising applicability. Collective behavior is an important topic of interdisciplinary study. Ethology has shown the ubiquity of collective behavior and has proven the rationality of evolutionary theory in explaining the emergence of collective behavior. The recent development of complex network theory offers a convenient framework for describing game interactions and competition relationships among individuals. The combination of evolutionary games and complex networks, particularly, evolutionary game theory in a complex network, has been attracting growing interest from different fields. It has undergone substantial development, especially in quantitative analysis of two-strategy competition. Under this framework, the complex network represents the population structure, and the game describes interactions between individuals. On the basis of the methodology from network science, stochastic process, and statistical physics, the framework mainly focuses on how population structures, individual behavior patterns, and interacting environments influence the emergence of collective behavior. In this paper, the mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation were given under the framework of evolutionary game, including kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. Recently, the effects of individual heterogeneity and environmental feedback on cooperation had attracted growing interest. Next, five main theoretical methods were addressed for analyzing the evolutionary game in complex networks, including the \sigma - dominance rule, the coalescing theory, the pairwise approximation, the coalescing random walk theory, and the adaptive dynamics. Particularly, the recently proposed coalescing random walk theory is suitable for analyzing the dynamics of any network structure and any update rule. Then, the studies on the evolution of fairness in ultimatum games were presented, and reasonable resource allocation is the key factor for social stability, economic development, and individual health. Finally, the challenges and further directions of studying ultimatum games in a complex network were summarized.

     

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