网络安全等级保护下的区块链评估方法

朱岩; 张艺; 王迪; 秦博涵; 郭倩; 冯荣权; 赵章界

doi:10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2019.12.17.007

网络安全等级保护下的区块链评估方法

doi: 10.13374/j.issn2095-9389.2019.12.17.007

朱岩^1, ,,
张艺^{1, 2},
王迪¹,
秦博涵¹,
郭倩¹,
冯荣权³,
赵章界⁴

1.
北京科技大学计算机与通信工程学院，北京 100083
2.
中国科学院软件研究所，北京 100190
3.
北京大学数学科学学院，北京 100871
4.
北京信息安全测评中心，北京 100101

基金项目: 国家科技部重点研发计划资助项目（2018YFB1402702）；国家自然科学基金资助项目（61972032）；北京市经济和信息化局资助项目（HTBH_20200901_573）

详细信息

通讯作者:
E-mail：zhuyan@ustb.edu.cn

中图分类号: TP306
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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2019-12-17
- 刊出日期: 2020-10-25

Research on blockchain evaluation methods under the classified protection of cybersecurity

1.
School of Computer and Communication Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
2.
Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
3.
School of Mathematics Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
4.
Beijing Information Security Test and Evaluation Center, Beijing 100101, China

More Information

Corresponding author: E-mail: zhuyan@ustb.edu.cn

摘要

摘要: 等级保护（简称等保）是我国信息安全的基本政策，随着区块链技术在各行业中的应用日趋广泛，有必要同步推进区块链系统的等级保护测评工作，这将有利于推动该技术在我国的持续健康发展。有鉴于此，依据等保第三级的应用和数据安全要求，给出了区块链系统中对等网络、分布式账本、共识机制和智能合约等核心技术的具体测评要求及实施方案，并从等保2.0规定的控制点出发，分别对当前区块链系统运行数据与基于日志流程的安全审计机制进行了归纳与分析。通过上述评估与分析可知区块链系统在软件容错、资源控制和备份与恢复等方面满足等保要求，而在安全审计、身份鉴别、数据完整性等方面则有待进一步改进。
- 区块链 /
- 网络安全等级保护 /
- 对等网络 /
- 共识机制 /
- 评估与分析
Abstract: A blockchain is a cryptographic distributed database and network transaction accounting system. In the current era of major technological changes, blockchain technology, with its cryptographic structure, peer-to-peer (P2P) network, consensus mechanism, smart contract and other mechanisms, is decentralized, tamper-proof, and traceable and has become a hot spot in the development of informatization. Classified protection is one of the basic policies of information security in China. The implementation of the information security level protection system can not only guide various industries in performing security management in accordance with the equivalent security standards, but also ensure that supervision and evaluation institutions follow the laws and regulations, which is of significance to network security. As the application of blockchain technology in various industries is becoming more extensive, it is necessary to simultaneously promote the national classified protection of blockchain security assessment, which contributes to the sustainable and healthy development of blockchains in China. According to the revised assessment methods of grade protection, in addition to the status of universality requirements, evaluation specifications should be formulated for specific technologies and fields (such as cloud computing, mobile Internet, Internet of Things, industrial control, and big data). In view of the particularity of blockchain technology, China has initiated the formulation of blockchain evaluation specifications, but has not applied the level protection standards to the formulation of blockchain evaluation specifications. Therefore, the assessment requirements and enforcement proposals are specified for the blockchain’s core technologies, such as P2P network, distributed ledger, consensus mechanism, and smart contracts, according to the application and data security layer requirements at Level 3. Moreover, the current running data of blockchains and their security audit mechanism based on the log workflow were summarized and analyzed respectively in compliance with the control points specified in classified protection 2.0. Our investigation indicates that blockchains can satisfy the requirements of evaluation items in three aspects, namely, software fault tolerance, resource control, and backup and recovery. However, further improvements are needed for other aspects, including security audit, access control, identification and authentication, and data integrity.
- blockchain /
- classified protection of cybersecurity /
- peer-to-peer network /
- consensus mechanism /
- assessment and analysis

HTML全文

图 1 区块链框架

Figure 1. Blockchain framework

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图 2 比特币P2P网络规模变化图。（a）近3个月比特币网络规模变化图；（b） 2009年之后比特币网络规模变化图

Figure 2. Scale change of Bitcoin P2P network: (a) scale change of Bitcoin P2P network in last three months; (b) scale change of Bitcoin P2P network since 2009

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图 3 共识过程时序关系图

Figure 3. Consensus timing diagram

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图 4 比特币全网算力图

Figure 4. Bitcoin hashrate historical chart

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图 5 共识机制难度变化趋势图（比特币）

Figure 5. Consensus difficulty change trend diagram（Bitcoin）

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图 6 区块链交易结构

Figure 6. Structure of blockchain transaction

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图 7 区块链系统中已确认和未确认交易数量对比（近3个月）。（a）比特币与以太坊确认交易量图；（b）比特币中未确认交易增长变化图

Figure 7. Comparison between confirmed and unconfirmed transactions in the blockchain systems: (a) diagram of confirmed transactions for Bitcoin and Ethereum; (b) growth chart of unconfirmed transactions for Bitcoin

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图 8 常用脚本机制

Figure 8. Common scripting mechanism

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图 9 区块链日志生成流程图

Figure 9. Blockchain log workflow chart

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表 1 定级要素与安全等级的关系

Table 1. Relation between grading elements and safety level

程度 Degree	公民、法人、其他组织 Citizens, corporations and other organizations	社会秩序、社会公共利益 Social order, public interest	国家安全 National security
损害 General damage	第一级 Level 1	第二级 Level 2	第三级 Level 3
严重损害 Significant damage	第二级 Level 2	第三级 Level 3	第四级 Level 4
特别严重损害 Especially significant damage	第三级 *Level 3	第四级 Level 4	第五级 Level 5
* Classified protection 1.0 is level 2.

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表 2 等级保护1.0与2.0三级应用层控制点对比

Table 2. Comparison of application layer control points in classified protection 1.0 and 2.0 at level 3

版本 Version	类别 Category	控制点 Control points
等级保护1.0 Classified protection 1.0	应用安全 Application security	身份鉴别、访问控制、安全审计、通信完整性、通信保密性、软件容错、资源控制 Identity authentication, access control, security audit, communication integrity, communication confidentiality, software fault tolerance, resource control
等级保护1.0 Classified protection 1.0	数据安全及备份恢复 Data security and backup recovery	数据完整性、数据保密性、备份和恢复 Data integrity, data confidentiality, backup and recovery
等级保护2.0 Classified protection 2.0	应用和数据安全 Application and data security	身份鉴别、访问控制、安全审计、软件容错、资源控制、数据完整性、数据保密性、数据备份和恢复、剩余信息保护、个人信息保护 Identity authentication, access control, security audit, software fault tolerance, resource control, data integrity, data confidentiality, data backup and recovery, residual information protection, personal information protection

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表 3 分布式对等网络测评

Table 3. Distributed peer-to-peer network assessment

类别 Categories	测评项 Items	实施 Implementation	预期效果 Expected Effectiveness	实际测评结果说明 Description of actual evaluation results	达标 Y/N
身份鉴别 Identification	节点接入控制 Node link control	查看连入区块链是否需要认证 Check if the connection to the Blockchain requires authentication	当节点连入系统时，对其进行身份认证，控制节点接入 When nodes are connected, the system authenticates themto restrict node access.	节点接入时没有对身份进行认证 The identity is not authenticated when the node is connected.	否 N
软件容错 Software fault tolerance	自我保护与自适应 Self-protection and self-adaptation	网络不稳定时查看信息传输情况 Inspect information transmission when the network is unstable.	网络抖动对传输不会造成太大影响，系统运行稳定Network jitter does not have much impact on transmission. Blockchain runs stably.	网络抖动时，区块链系统运行稳定 Blockchain system runs stably when network jitter occurs.	是 Y
资源控制 Resource control	并发连接限制 Concurrent connection restriction	查看节点最大连接数目 View the maximum number of connections on nodes	对最大并发连接进行限制，防止系统资源耗尽 Limit maximum concurrent connections to prevent system resource exhaustion	节点连接不超过117个输入连接，向其他节点发起 8个输出连接。 Node connections do not exceed 117 input connections and 8 output connections.	是 Y
资源控制 Resource control	连接超时限制 Connection timeout limit	查看相关网络配置 View related network configurations	自动结束长期无应答的会话防止系统资源占用 Automatically end long-term unanswered sessions to prevent system resource usage.	某个节点超过30 min没有新消息，则发送心跳消息，长达90 min没有通信，则结束会话 If there is no communication for more than 30 minutes, a heartbeat message is sent. End the session if there is no communication for 90 minutes.	是 Y
数据完整性 Data integrity	单播通信防篡改 Anti-tampering of unicast	查看数据传输是否加密防篡改安全 Check whether data transmission is encrypted and tamper-proof	数据在点对点通信过程中不被篡改 Data is not tampered with in the process of point-to-point communication.	不能保障数据在单播通信过程中的完整性 The integrity of data in unicast communication cannot be guaranteed.	否 N
	广播通信防篡改 Multicast communication tamper-proof	能否提供通信多播，广播功能，通信过程中数据是否防篡改 Check whether the system can provide communication multicast, broadcast function and tamper-proof data in the process of communication	数据在广播通信过程中不被篡改 Data is not tampered with during broadcast communication.	不能保障数据在广播通信过程中的完整性 The Bitcoin system does not guarantee the integrity of data in the broadcast communication process.	否 N
	转发通信防篡改 Forwarding communication tamper-proof	转发功能及数据防篡改 Data tampering prevention in forwarding communication	数据在某节点通过转发时不被篡改 Data is not tampered with when forwarded by a node.	不能保障数据在转发通信过程中的完整性 The integrity of data in the process of forwarding communication cannot be guaranteed	否 N
安全审计 Security audit	网络状态获取更新 Network status get update	查看日志是否记录节点状态信息 Check whether the log records node status information.	能够为系统的稳定运行提供可信的节点数据 Ability to provide trusted node data for stable operation of the system.	存在单个节点的状态更新记录，但更新记录不进行全网交换，无法获取全网状态 There is a status update record for a single node. However, update records are not exchanged in the whole network, the whole network status cannot be obtained.	否 N
安全审计 Security audit	网络节点动态监测 Network node dynamic monitoring	是否对在线节点数量进行统计 Statistics on the number of online nodes	具备对节点动态增加和减少的识别能力 Ability to recognize nodes dynamically increasing and decreasing.	区块链系统具备全网节点数量实时统计能力 The Bitcoin system does not have the real-time statistical ability of the number of nodes in the whole network.	是 Y

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表 4 不同区块链参数选择对网络传输影响^[43]

Table 4. Impact of parameter selection on network transmission in different blockchains^[43]

Parameter	Bitcoin	Litecoin	Dogecoin	Ethereum
区块间隔 Block interval	10 min 10 min	2.5 min 2.5 min	1 min 1 min	10−20 s 10−20 s
公共节点 Public nodes	6000	800	600	4000
挖矿池 Mining pools	16	12	12	13
陈腐块率/% Stale block rate	0.41	0.273	0.619	6.8
区块大小/KB Block size	534.8	6.11	8	1.5

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表 5 共识机制测评

Table 5. Consensus mechanism assessment

类别 Categories	测评项 Items	实施 Implementation	预期效果 Expected effectiveness	实际测评结果说明 Description of actual evaluation results	达标 Y/N
资源控制 Resource control	共识资源控制 Consensus resource control	检测计算机中资源使用情况。 Check the use of resources in the computer	共识机制消耗计算机资源应该最小化原则 Consensus mechanisms should minimize the consumption of computer resources.	PoW共识机制计算资源耗费较大，但系统资源可控 PoW consumes a lot of computing resources, but the system resources are controllable.	是 Y
备份与恢复 Backup and recovery	实时备份 Real-time backup	查看节点是否同步了新共识区块 Check whether the node has synchronized the new consensus block	全网节点具有相同的数据副本 All network nodes have the same data replica.	节点实时备份区块链中产生的交易数据 Real-time backup of transaction data generated in Bitcoin system by nodes.	是 Y
备份与恢复 Backup and recovery	系统热冗余 System hot redundancy	查看节点瘫痪后系统可用性 View system availability after node paralysis	业务连续性未被中断 Business continuity not interrupted.	节点之间互为冗余，单一或少数节点故障不影响系统稳定性和可用性 Nodes are redundant to each other and single or few node failures do not affect the stability and availability of the system.	是 Y
共识效果 Consensus effect	共识容错性 Consensus fault tolerance	设置异常节点，查看共识情况 Set exception nodes and view consensus.	存在共识阈值，使得超过阈值的节点达到共识即代表全网共识完成 There is a consensus threshold, so that the node exceeding the threshold reaches the consensus, which means that the consensus of the whole network is completed.	系统可容纳5%的节点共识错误。95%以上的节点共识成功即可 The system can accommodate 5% node consensus errors. More than 95% of the nodes are successful.	是 Y
	共识有效性 Consensus Effectiveness	发起非法交易，查看共识是否失败 Initiate an illegal transaction to see if the consensus failed	非法交易共识失败。通过对交易进行正确性和逻辑性验证，使恶意造假交易的代价昂贵，避免恶意共识 Illegal transaction consensus failed. By verifying the correctness and logic of the transaction, the cost of malicious fraudulent transactions is expensive and avoids malicious consensus.	非法交易不能被共识通过 Illegal transactions cannot be passed by consensus.	是 Y
	共识结果一致性 Consensus consistency	发起合法交易，查看共识结果是否满足一致 Initiate a legal transaction and see if the consensus result is consistent	忠诚参与方共识结果具有一致性 Loyal participant consensus results are consistent.	对于合法交易区块链系统达成共识后写入区块链 After agreeing on the legal transaction of Bitcoin system, it is written into the blockchain.	是 Y

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表 6 分布式账本测评

Table 6. Distributed ledger assessment

类别 Categories	测评项 Items	实施 Implementation	预期效果 Expected effectiveness	实际测评结果说明 Description of actual evaluation results	达标 Y/N
软件容错 Software fault tolerance	账本格式规范性 Standardization of ledger	查看账本中的数据格式是否有统一标准 Check whether the data format in the ledger has a uniform standard	交易、区块等数据按照数据格式进行存储 Data such as transactions and blocks are stored in data format.	区块链系统交易、区块等均有统一组织标准 Blockchain system transactions, blocks, etc. have unified organizational standards.	是 Y
访问控制 Access control	账本访问控制 Ledger access control	查看是否存在访问策略监管节点及访问控制策略 Check whether there is an access policy supervision node and access control policy	对账本上的数据资源进行保护，防止非法访问 Protect the data resources on the ledger against illegal access	作为公有链系统没有完备的访问控制策略 Bitcoin as a public blockchain, there is no complete access control strategy	否 N
数据完整性 Data integrity	存储完整性 Storage integrity	查看数据存储是否存在哈希、指纹等机制保障存储的完整性 Check if there is a hash mechanism in the data storage to ensure the integrity of the storage	存储内容被哈希处理，完整性得到保障 Stored data is hashed and integrity is guaranteed.	将交易按照默克尔树的形式进行哈希并存储于区块 Bitcoin hashes transactions in the form of Merkel trees and stores them in blocks.	是 Y
数据保密性 Data confidentiality	存储保密性 Storage Confidentiality	查看机密数据的存储是否加密 Check if the storage of confidential data is encrypted	数据存储不是以明文格式 Data is not stored in plaintext format.	数据存储是以明文的16进制形式进行存储，方便查询和验证 Bitcoin data storage is stored in plaintext in hexadecimal form, which is convenient for query and verification.	否 N
账本功能 Ledgerfunction	数据抗抵赖 Data non-repudiation	查看账本中的交易数据来源是否有效 Check if the transaction data in the ledger is signed	交易被各个参与方签名，使交易可溯源，以达到抗抵赖的作用。 The transaction is signed by each participant, so that the transaction can be traceable to achieve the role of non-repudiation.	区块链系统通过对交易数据进行签名达到了数据抗抵赖的作用 Bitcoin achieves data non-repudiation by signing transaction data.	是 Y
	账本数据同步 Ledger data synchronization	查看是否有完全节点，节点间存储账本数据是否一致 Check if there is a full node, store all data in the ledger	全节点中同步了账本中所有的数据，可以通过全节点得到区块链数据的完整副本 All the data in the ledger is synchronized in the full node. A complete copy of the blockchain data can be obtained from full nodes.	区块链系统中存在同步了账本所有数据的全节点，并能对同步过程中发现的数据错误予以检测及确认 There are full nodes in the Bitcoin system that synchronize all the data of the ledger.	是 Y
	账本数据幂等 Ledger data idempotentce	查看账本信息中检索同样的数据结果是否一致 Check if the results of retrieving the same data are consistent	在查询相同记录时具有相同的结果，确保数据的一致性 Ensure data consistency by querying the same records with the same results.	区块链系统存入账本的数据均通过共识，账本数据具有幂等性 The data of Bitcoin deposited in the ledger has passed the consensus, and ledger data has idempotency.	是 Y

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表 7 区块链头信息及长度限制

Table 7. Information and length limit of Blockchain Header

数据项 Items	用途 Use	大小（字节） Size(byte)
区块版本V Version	区块版本号 Block version number	4
难度D Difficulty Target	用以标注挖矿难度 To indicate the difficulty of mining	4
前区块哈希 PreH Pre-block hash	基于区块中所有交易的256位hash值 Based on the 256-bit hash value of all transactions in the block	32
默克尔树根M Merkletree Root	交易内容hash256值 The value of the transaction content 256-bit hash	32
随机数N Nonce	用以调整当前区块头hash值 To adjust the current block head hash value	4
时间戳T Timestamp	UNIX时间戳A UNIX timestamp	4

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表 8 区块链合约计算层测评

Table 8. Blockchain contract computing layer evaluation

类别 Categories	测评项 Items	实施 Implementation	预期效果 Expected effectiveness	实际测评结果说明 Description of actual evaluation results	达标 Y/N
身份鉴别 Identification	执行身份验证 Performingentity authentication	查看合约是否许可查看或限定执行者身份 Check if the contract can be viewed or qualify executor’s identity	应对登录的用户进行身份标识和鉴别，身份标识具有唯一性，身份鉴别信息具有复杂度 The identification and authentication should be carried out for the logged-in user. The identification is required to be unique and complicated.	在发布交易时，区块链会对执行者身份进行验证，因此可以控制执行合约的身份 When publishing a transaction, the blockchain verifies the executor’s identity, thus constraining the execution of contract.	是 Y
安全审计 Security audit	行为事件审计 Behavioral event audit	能否验证智能合约的执行 Check if to verify the execution of smart contract	应启用安全审计功能，审计覆盖到每个用户，对重要的用户行为和重要安全事件进行审计 The security audit function should be enabled to cover every user over significant user actions and security events.	所有参与挖矿节点会验证智能合约执行的正确性 All nodes involved in mining can verify the correctness of smart contract execution.	是 Y
安全审计 Security audit	审计记录 Audit records	是否记录了审计的相关信息 Check if audit information is recorded	审计记录应包括事件的日期和时间、用户、事件类型、事件是否成功等。应对审计记录进行保护，定期备份，避免受到未预期的删除、修改或覆盖等 The audit record should include the date and time of event, the executor, the type of event, the state if the event was successful, etc. Audit records should be protected and backed up regularly to avoid unexpected deletions, modifications or overwrites.	区块中的交易记录了智能合约的执行时间、执行用户、执行的输入与输出 The transactions in the block record the execution time, the executors, the input and output of the smart contract.	否 N
恶意代码防范 Malicious code protection	免受恶意代码攻击 Protection from malicious code	是否有免受恶意代码攻击的机制 Check if there is a mechanism to protect against malicious code	应采用免受恶意代码攻击的技术措施或主动免疫可信验证机制及时识别入侵和病毒行为，并将其有效阻断。 It is necessary to adopt the technical measures to avoid the attack of malicious code or the trusted verification mechanism with active immunity to identify the intrusion and virus behavior in time and block it effectively.	通过限定的寻址方式、限定的指令集以及Docker等运行环境或其他机制使得本地计算机及区块链系统不会受到影响 Local computers and blockchain systems do not be affected byrestricted addressing methods, limited instruction sets, operating platforms such as Docker, or other mechanisms.	是 Y
数据完整性 Data integrity	传输完整性 Transmission integrity	查看是否通过校验技术或密码技术保证数据完整性 Check if data integrity is guaranteed by CRC or cryptography	应采用校验技术或密码技术保证重要数据在传输过程中的完整性。 Verification technology or cryptography should be adopted to ensure the integrity of important data during transmission.	存在单个节点的状态更新记录 There are status updating records for individual nodes.	是 Y
数据保密性 Data confidentiality	传输保密性 Transmission confidentiality	查看是否通过密码技术保证数据保密性 Check if data onidenticality is guaranteed by cryptography.	应采用密码技术保证重要数据在传输过程中的保密性。 Cryptography should be adopted to ensure the confidentiality of important data during transmission.	区块链系统不具备全网节点数量实时统计能力 The blockchain system does not have the real-time statistical ability on the number of nodes in the whole network.	否 N

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表 9 区块链系统error审计分类

Table 9. Blockchain error audit classification

功能 Function	接口函数 Interface function	输出错误 Output error
初始化错误 Initialization error	AppInit2_Cold()	Winsock库、初始化完整性检测、钱包文件损坏等 Winsock Library, Initial Integrity Detection, Wallet File Damage, etc.
交易错误 Transaction error	CheckTransaction()	检查交易时出错，如输入输出为空等交易格式错误 Errors in checking transactions, such as empty input and output, etc.
	AcceptToMemoryPool()	验证交易合理性并存入交易池时发生错误，如输入已经被花费等 Errors occur when validating the reasonableness of transactions and storing them in the trading pool, such as input being spent, etc.
	CScriptCheck()	脚本签名错误 Script signature error
	CheckInputs()	交易输入错误，如：交易总输入<总输出 Transaction input errors, such as: total transaction input <total output
	CheckSignature()	检查签名时出错 Error in checking signature
区块错误 Block error	WriteBlockToDisk()	将区块写入磁盘出错，如文件打开失败 Errors in writing blocks to disk, such as file opening failure
	ReadBlockFromDisk()	从磁盘读出区块出错，如打开区块文件失败 Error reading block from disk, such as failure to open block file
	DisconnectBlock()	断开区块链接时出错 Error while disconnecting block links
	ConnectBlock()	连接区块时出错，如资产提交时出错 Error connecting blocks, such as asset submission
	CheckBlock()	检查区块时出错，如默克尔树根不匹配 Error checking blocks, such as Merkle root mismatch
	ContextualCheckBlockHeader	检查区块头部信息是否出错，如块的时间戳太早 Check if block header information is wrong, such as block timestamp too early
	LoadBlockIndex()	加载区块索引出错，如将创世块写入磁盘失败 Error loading block index, such as failure to write Genesis block to disk
共识错误 Consensus error	CheckBlockHeader()	工作量证明失败 Proof-of-work error
共识错误 Consensus error	AcceptBlock()	未找到工作量证明 Accepting blocks makes errors, such as failing to find proof-of-work
网络错误 Network error	RecvLine()	socket错误Socket error
	Read()	连接节点数据文件peer.dat读错误 Error in peer.dat reading of connection node data file
	Write()	连接节点数据文件peer.dat写错误 Error in peer.dat writing of connection node data file
	Connect()	连接错误 Connection error
	ProcessMessage()	侦听并处理网络中的不同的消息时出错 Errors in listening for and processing different messages in the network
远程过程调用 Remote procedure call	JSONRPCError	远程过程调用请求、解析、参数等错误 Errors in remote procedure call requests, parsing, parameters, etc.

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表 10 区块链系统测评结果总结

Table 10. Summary of evaluation results of blockchain system

	类别 Categories	测评项 Items	达标 √/×
	类别 Categories	测评项 Items	比特币 Bitcoin	以太坊 Ethereum	超级账本 Hyperledger
分布式对等网络测评 Distributed P2P network assessment	软件容错 Software fault tolerance	自我保护与自适应 Self-protection and self-adaptation	√	√	√
	资源控制 Resource control	并发连接限制 Concurrent connection restriction	√	√	√
	资源控制 Resource control	连接超时限制 Connection timeout limit	√	√	√
	身份鉴别 Identification	节点接入控制 Node link control	×	×	√
分布式对等网络测评 Distributed P2P network assessment	数据完整性 Data integrity	单播通信防篡改 Anti-tampering of unicast	×	×	×
		广播通信防篡改 Multicast communication tamper-proof	×	×	×
		转发通信防篡改 Forwarding communication tamper-proof	×	×	×
	安全审计 Security audit	网络状态获取更新 Network status get update	×	×	√
	安全审计 Security audit	网络节点动态监测 Network node dynamic monitoring	√	√	√
分布式账本测评 Distributed ledgers assessment	软件容错 Software fault tolerance	账本格式规范性 Standardization of ledger	√	√	√
	访问控制 Access control	账本访问控制 Ledger access control	×	×	√
	数据完整性 Data integrity	存储完整性 Storage integrity	√	√	√
	数据保密性 Data confidentiality	存储保密性 Storage confidentiality	×	×	×
	账本功能 Ledger function	数据抗抵赖 Data non-repudiation	√	√	√
		账本数据同步 Ledger data synchronization	√	√	√
		账本数据幂等 Ledger data idempotence	√	√	√
共识机制测评 Consensus mechanism assessment	资源控制 Resource control	共识资源测评 Consensus Resource Control	√	√	√
	备份与恢复 Backup and recovery	实时备份 Real-time backup	√	√	√
	备份与恢复 Backup and recovery	系统热冗余 System hot redundancy	√	√	√
	共识效果 Consensus effect	共识容错性 Consensus fault tolerance	√	√	√
		共识有效性 Consensus effectiveness	√	√	√
		共识结果一致性 Consensus Consistency	√	√	√
合约计算层测评 Contract computing layer assessment	身份鉴别 Identification	执行身份验证 Performing entity authentication	√	√	√
	安全审计 Security audit	行为事件审计 Behavioral event audit	√	√	√
	安全审计 Security audit	审计记录 Audit records	×	×	×
	恶意代码防范 Malicious code protection	免受恶意代码攻击 Protection from malicious code	√	√	√
	数据完整性 Data integrity	传输完整性 Transmission integrity	√	√	√
	数据保密性 Data confidentiality	传输保密性 Transmission confidentiality	×	×	×
统计 Statistics	达标个数 Number of qualified items		19 Nineteen	19 Nineteen	22 Twenty-two

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